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The publication or the so-callea 
majority and minority reports did not 
reveal the full intricacy of the 
discussions. It was not, as Fr. Murphy 
suggests, merely a question of holding 
the traditional line no matter what the 
cost. This is clear from the minority 
report ·which, although 'I presided at 
many meetings of the ·Pontifical 
Commission, I had not seen before it 
appeared in The Tablet~ It was not 
signed by any of the cardinals or 
bishops. I assume that the priests who 
signed sent their views privately to the 
Pope. This does not constitute what in 
.England we would call an official 
minority report. 
DOCTORS DISAGREE 
The problem facing the Pope 
concerns not only contraception itself 
but the morality of certain methods. 
This does . not mean that the Pope 
must adjudicate on the various 
contraceptive appliances, chemicals or 
pills. This is obviously not the task of 
the Church. Herein, I imagine, the 
chief difficulty lies. Everyone knows 
that some contraceptives are 
abortifacients while others · induce 
temporary sterility. It follows that the 
morality of sterilisation and abortion . 
might need to be reconsidered. 
Medical science is , not yet ready to 
pronounce on the likely effects of . 
contraceptive pills. Many doctors 
regard them as reasonably safe. A 
strong minority will have nothing to 
do with them in the present state of 
medical knowledge. They will not 
permit their wives to take the risk of 
using them. It may not yet be possible 
to prove a causal connection between 
smoking and lung cancer. A causal 
connection between the use of certain 
contraceptive pills and thrombosis is 
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similarly under .irivestigation. T ~re are 
doctors who fear that del ~erious 
effects niay reve~ themselves 1 Jy in a 
future generation. They refer f ,)Omily 
to the lesson provided y the 
thalidomide babies. All this l 'S to be 
weighed by the Pope before .e gives 
the Church his guidance. It ". ·.mld be 
irresponsible to attempt to rce ·the 
Vicar of Christ to ake a 
pronouncement before he is r !dy. 
Nobody knows what the ,. ~)fld will 
be like in ten years' time. l >. Jer God 
it depends largely on the gre:· · powers. 
Before the end of this dec · :e China 
will . almost certainly have -.,_;veloped 
every kind of nuclear device 'Ne know 
from scientists that if testinr · ntinues 
on -a large scale the effe, : will be 
unpredictable. Thirty yea: . ago the 
experts warned us of tl · risk of 
depopulation. We now kno" that they 
were wrong. The experts )day give 
warning of intolerable ove1-;. opulation 
by the end of the centur·. They, in 
turn, may be made wrong .~y genetic 
changes in mankind. Wha, the Pope 
says will, of co u ! .e , have 
comparatively small effe,· on tot~ 
world population. The 1 ,·-1jority ll1 
Ash'I, Africa and South AI" ~- .dca is not 
likely to be guided by papal 
pro noun.cements. Th t; Se most 
anxiously awaiting guidm,ce are the 
devoted Catholics living mainly in the 
West who are troubled j~ss by the 
threat of over-population :.han by the 
physical and psychological hazards ~f 
married life in moderri conditions. It 15 
these people and their d ergy ~ho 
desp'erately · await tlL' pronused 
statement. Today in the same to~, 
and even in the same pansh, priests lfl 
the confessional offer conflicting 
advice. I believe this to be the chief 
reason for the present state of the 
magisterium. 
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Moral Principles Applicable to Organ 
Transplantation 
Benedict A. Paparella, Ph. D. 
Recent advances in transplant 
aurgery have created a need for a 
re-evaluation of the moral principles 
Ythich might be applied in the 
1~'-·0IIoluttio,n of certain of the problems 
equent upon such medical 
.. ".~""~~. The present article makes no 
:Jre1tense at giving to the medical or 
worlds definitive answers which 
make their respective tasks a 
matter of "application of 
IIIUIICll>Je." One might criticize the 
as being but a repetition of what 
already been said by eminent 
and moralists. Such a 
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~rno1~a University and a Lecturer in 
Philosophy at Gwynedd-Mercy 
He holds a B.S. degree from 
-~,to1tm University and attained 
and fh. D. degrees from The 
University of America. He has 
.. ,rsm~ articles and reviews in such 
Wfl)dil."!nl~ as The Thomist, The New 
Modern Schoolman, 
The Benedictine Review. In 1965 
Wt11 awanled the Lindback A ward 
distinguished teaching at Villanova 
; At present he is Associate · 
of the St. Augustine Lecture 
published by the Augustinian 
at Villanova, and Associate 
of a new journal, Augustinian 
to be published in 196 9. 
criticism would indeed be justified; for 
it is the ·purpose of the author to 
present a collation of thoughts and 
principles, mainly from the Christian 
point of view, which woUld be 
applicable to the possible resolution of 
the moral problems of organ 
transplantation, and at the same time 
open the many doors of the "house of 
dialogue" which follow from such a 
presentation. 
MEANS OF PRESERVING LIFE 
Since man is obliged to use all 
reasonable and moral means of 
preserving his bodily health and well 
being, let us for the moment briefly 
consider the moralist's distinction of 
ordinary and extraordinary means of 
preserving one's life and bodily 
integrity. Fr. Murray is brief but 
concise in this matter in saying: 
Ordinary means might best be 
defined as those that are at hand, 
and do not entail effort, suffer1ng, 
or expense beyond that which 
prudent men would consider proper 
for a serious undertaking according 
to the state of life of each 
individual person. Extraordinary 
means, on the other hand, are 
means that are not commonly used 
by prudent persons, and that 
in~olve se-rious difficulty or 
inconvenience. 1 
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Fr. Kelly tells us that the theologian 
would say that: 
... ordinary means of preserving 
life are all medicines, treatments, 
and operations, which offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit for the 
patient and which can be obtained. 
and used· without ·excessive 
expense, pain, or other 
inconvenience ... In 
contradistinction to ordinary are 
extraordinary means of preserving 
life. By these . we mean all 
medicines, treatments, and 
operations, which cannot be 
obtained or used without excessive 
expense, pain or other 
inconvenience, or which, if used, 
would not ·-offer a reasonable hope 
of benefit.2 
From another point of view: 
Ordinary means may be natural, as 
sufficient nourishment, protection 
against heat and cold, rest, hygiene, 
ordinary rem_edies, ordinary 
nursing; and artificial, as certain 
ordinary techniques, intravenous 
serum, oxygen, blood transfus~ons, 
insulin, incubators and minor 
operations. . .. It is not easy to 
give an exact definition of 
extraordinary means of preserving 
life. However they can be 
recognized from the following 
general characteristics: little chance 
of success, high cost, and 
objectionable aspects. 3 
Not only is it difficult to determine 
in the practical order of things what is 
ordinazy and extraordinary in some 
cases, but the difficulty is 
compounded by the different uses to 
which the physician puts these terms.4 
However, there are some means which 
most moralists consider as 
extraordinary for all men, "such as 
rare and expensive operations or 
extensive traveling for one's health; 
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whereas the same ethici~ms . c ;nsider 
most of the commonly 2'- ailable 
techniques of modern surgt· f and 
medicine as ordinary meam '5 St. 
Alphonsus tells us that no ~1an is 
obliged to use an extraordinar . means 
of preserving health of life , · 'Jt that 
we are allowed to empk r such 
means.6 In certain cases one 1 <ty have 
a duty to use extraordinar means 
when his failure to do so wo~ · d result 
in a failure to fulfill other du : ,;s, such 
as in the case of the head of : nation 
upon whom rests the sec;·. 'ty and 
well-being of those under I- charge. 
At this point let us ·simply .~ate that 
one is always obliged to u& Jrdinary 
means of sustaining bodily ---ztegrity; 
whe-reas, one may use ex t•·. 1rdinary 
means if he so desires or if ('t "' h means 
is necessary for the fulfillme: ·. of some 
other grave obligation. · 
MUTILATION AND CO.''SENT 
St. · Thomas Aquinas ·. )eaks of 
mutilation as follows: 
Since a member is IY1, t of the whol~- human body , it is for the 
sake of the whole, as th;- imperfect 
for the perfect. Hence, a ,nember of 
the human body is to h~ disposed 
of according as it is expedient for 
the body. Now a member of the 
human body is of itse tf useful to 
the good of the whole body, yet, 
accidentally it may happen to be 
hurtful, as when a decayed member 
is a source of corruption to the 
whole body-.... If, however, the 
member be decayed an d therefore, 
a source of corruption to the whole 
body then it is lawful with the cons~nt of the owner of the 
member to cut away the member 
for the ~elfare of the whole body, 
since each one is ent rusted with the 
care of his own welfare. 7 
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.. what Aquinas tells us we can 
that -when mutilation becomes 
"for the· welfare of the 
body," as in medically indicated 
surgery, the consent of the 
must be 9btained. In this 
article 6 of the Moral Code 
by the Canadian Hierarchy in 
, 1954, states: 
the procedures listed in this 
as permissible require the 
nsent, at least reasonably 
of the patient or his 
This condition is to be 
llll<lers1tood in e.ach .case. 
consents to_ a medical or 
procedure, it is necessary that 
t be of his own free choice. 
Nuremberg Code represents ten 
to which physicians should 
when engaged in experiments 
ns. The PTinciples grew out of 
.JU(lgntent laid down at Nuremberg, 
during the war crimes 
in August of 1947. The 
defendents, mostly 
were accused of crimes 
involved experimentation upon 
subject's. The world is still 
at the merciless and inhumane 
in which these experiments 
conducted. The code clearly 
out that the first consideration 
experimentation is the 
consent of the subjects: 
voluntary consent of the 
an subject is absolutely 
This means that the 
involved should have legal 
to give c.onsent; should be 
lltllate· :d as to be able to exercise 
power of choice, without the 
tion of any element of 
; fraud, deceit, duress, 
pnc~acl1in2. or other ulterior form 
constratintorcoercion; and should 
sufficient knowledge and 
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comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved as to 
enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened 
deciswn.8 
However it should be kept in mind 
that in ' certain instances one may not 
be able to , give his personal consent. 
This may occur in such cases as when: 
1. One is not sui compos and his · 
parents or guardians have the moral or 
legal right to act in his behalf. 
2. An attending physician in a case 
of emergency - dis~ster, accident, 
etc., must anticipate consent of 
person. 
Nonetheless, it is essential that any 
medical or surgical treatment "require 
the consent, at least reasonably 
presumed, of the patient or his 
guardians," since "each one is 
entrusted with the care of his own 
welfare." It would seem then that the 
moral justification of mutilation 
would rest essentially upon free and 
deliberate consent of the individual as 
well as the proportionate necessity of 
saciificing a part of the body in an 
attempt to preserve the integrity of 
the whole. We will see later that the 
mutilation of one's body under certain 
conditions may be employed to save 
another. 
PRINCIPLE OF TOTALITY 
Earlier we spoke of the 
proportionate necessity of sacrificing 'a 
part of the body in an attempt to 
preserve the integrity of the whole. In 
order to comprehend such necessity 
we can here ask: What is man's 
relation to himself and to his body? In 
brief, let us simply state that God has 
direct dominion over life and over the 
human body, for God is . man's 
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is given to man, he has a consequent 
obligation to attain to all reasonable 
and moral means of sustaining that life 
and of avoiding needless danger to 
health, limb and body. As custodian of 
his life and bodily integrity man is 
obliged to tend to his physical and 
mental well-being. Mutillation is 
accomplished by means of an 
accidental or intended destruction of 
an organic function or removal of a 
bodily part which is necessary for 
bodily integrity. According to St. 
Thomas and most · moralists, it is 
morally permissibie when a bodily part 
threatens the integrity of the whole 
"to cut away the member _ for the 
welfare ofrthe whole body ;" 9 for , "it 
is morally permissible to sacrific~ a 
part for the good of the whole, when 
the welfare of the whole body cannot 
be secured by any other means."1 0 It 
should be clear that mutilation cannot 
be permitted except for a 
proportionately grave reason. That we 
may engage in a physical evil such as 
mutilation is ably expressed by Fr. 
Gerald Kelly as follows: 
.. . there are some physical evils 
that are naturally subordinated to 
higher ends, and we have a right ~o 
cause these evils in order to obtam 
these ends. Thus, the bodily 
member is. subordinated to the 
good of the whole bodY_, and one 
has a right to remove this member 
when this is necessary for the good 
of the whole ... the principle, evil 
is not to be done is not an 
absolutely universal principle. It 
refers absolutely to moral evil. As 
for physical evil it refers to those 
which lie outside the scope of the 
agent's direct rights (e.g., death of 
an innocent person); it does not 
refer to evils that one has a right to 
cause (e.g. , self-mutilation to 
preserve life or health; the deat~ of 
an enemy soldier or an unJUSt 
aggre~sor ). 1 1 
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Suffice it here to say t ha · we may 
morally mutilate an organ c 11ember 
for the adequate good of ·:: whole 
body when there is a pro• rtionate 
reason for the same. SucL ·t moral 
justification is founded on ~ 1 at Pope 
Pius XII termed the "Pn .~i ple of 
Totality." 12 In one of his .Jmerous 
addresses on medical an d ·. cientific 
subjects, the Pontif stated '1at man 
did not have "unlimited ·)wer to 
destroy or mutilate his be · and its 
functions." 
Nevertheless, by virt11 of the 
principle of totality, bv ··irtue of 
his right to use the sep.- es of his 
organism as a whole, ' :-; patient 
can allow individual r rs to be 
destroyed or mutilated ,, · .m and to 
the extent necessary fc the good 
of his being as a whole. 1 · 
And this could be done \'1 .~n it was 
necessary to "ensure 1 : being's 
existence and to avoid, o; naturally, 
to repair serious and last g damage 
which cannot otherwise bl~ ,voided or 
repaired." 1 4 
his The Pope is cautiG ·s in 
presentation of the pr;o;.;iple and 
repeats himself thus: 
This principle asserts i : .1t the part 
exist for the whole and that, 
consequently, the good Jf the pa~ 
remains subordinated t u the g?0 
of the whole , that thv whole lS a 
determining factor for :. he .Part and 
can disfose of it 1:1 1ts _own 
interest. 5 . 
"Thus, it is in ihe propel 
application of this pri.ricil-1le that we 
have the moral justification for 
surgical operati o ns such as 
appendectomy, cho lecystect·o~~~ 
thyroidectomy, lobotomy , et~. , b 
destruction of organs and functwns. ~ 
irradiation; medical treatments wit 
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untoward by-products, e.g. , 
antibotics; etc."16 From the 
of such medical and surgical 
bc:edures we can see that the 
evil effected is outweighed by 
physical good effected. And as 
Connell states it: "according to 
holic moral principles, the 
•t~atiion or excision of a . part of the 
is permitted only when there is 
ty or probability that benefit 
thereby come to the whole body 
sufficient measure to compensate 
the harm that has been done."1 7 
essential point in all these things 
in terms of the total welfare of 
patient, there is a just proportion 
the harm, inconvenience, and 
on the one hand, and, on the 
r hand, the good to be 
IDco.mplisllLed for the patient." 1 8 The 
of every medical or surgical 
must be evaluated in the 
of its purpose and necessity. "In 
ral, we may observe that 
of one's own body without 
reason, is an offense against 
perance or fortitude; while 
mutilation of the body 
UD[)th~er is an act of injustice."1 9 
OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
must consider that an act of 
or medical mutilation is one 
is intended to effect a good (to 
bodily integrity), although 
is foreseen that the same act will 
in an evil consequence (the 
IIWUICbo,n· or excision of body tissue 
. excision of some organ). Such an 
termed a voluntary in cause, or 
Indirectly voluntary act. On this 
tells us: . 
a difference between the 
which the act itself is 
and the . way in which its 
QeQutences are voluntary. That is 
in itself, or directly 
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voluntary, which is the thing willed, 
whether it be willed as an end or as 
means to an end. That is voluntary 
in cause, or indirectly voluntary, 
which is the unintended but 
foreseen consequence of something 
else that is voluntary in itself; the 
agent does not will it either as end 
or as means ... he wills the cause 
of which this ~s a necessary 
effect.20 
The indirectly voluntary act of 
twofold effect act brings into our 
account of moral principles applicable 
to the morality of tissue and organ 
transplantation which requires 
mutilation of the recipient and the 
donor as necessary surgical procedure, 
the principle of double effect. It is 
obvious that with the directly 
voluntary act, evil becomes the direct 
object of the will-act as either end or 
means. Of necessity such an act is not 
morally permitted, for one is never 
permitted to directly will an evil; i.e., 
one · may not morally choose to rob a 
bank. In an indirectly voluntary act, 
however, one does not will the evil 
effect which is brought into causal 
existence together with the good 
effect which is intended but rather, 
the evil effect is foreseen as a probable 
consequence of the direct action. Thus 
we may speak of an indirect 
mutilation (one which is indirectly 
voluntary) as one in which there is 
lessening of bodily integrity as a 
natural . effect of the act , but the in-
tention of the agent is directed toward 
the conservation of the total natural 
good, or the good of the whole body. 
As it were , the mutilation follows 
indirectly from the will-act, but there 
is a sufficient proportionality which 
exists between the indirect consequent 
effect and the directly intended or 
willed effect. In the two-fold effect act 
there are two effects which flow from 
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L-------l · of organic 
function or 
excision of 
a member of 
the body.) 
In order that one might engage in an 
act which has two effects, one good 
and one evil, the four conditions of 
the "principle of double effect" must 
be met. It is not sufficient that merely 
one or two or three conditions be met, 
but rather ·the act must be in 
conformity with each of the 
following: 
1. The act itself which brings about 
both a good effect and evil effect must 
be good or at least morally indifferent. 
The act of excision (or incision) in se 
is morally indifferent in its generic 
nature but becomes good when 
directed to some specific intention of 
the will as in . the excision of a 
malignant tumor, etc. 
2. The good effect must not be 
obtained by means of the evil effect in 
such a way that the good flows from 
the evil as follows: 
H.A. ---E.E.--- G.E. 
The importance of priority of good 
effect is not one of time but rather 
one of causality . . The evil effect may 
neither be means or agency of the 
good effect. One may not engage in 
evil that good may come of it - the 
end does not justify the means. One 
must be careful to note that the 
suppression of organic function or use 
of a member does not itself bring 
about the good which is intended; 
rather, it is the .ridding of th body of 
the pathologic condition t h 
good health to be restored m 
saved. 
3. The evil effect must in 
intended but merely toi 
casually connected with th 
good effect. If the evil effc · 
enter one's intention in an) :ay, even 
partially, the agent make this evil 
effect a directly voluntld · · act by 
willing it as end or mean The evil 
effect must simply be t . r; rated as 
unavoidable and as concan tant with 
the good effect. As Aquina .ells us: 
"Nothing hinders om 
having two effects, <-" 
which is intended, wh 
·is beside the intention ." 
4. There must exist ~~ reasonable 
proportion between the g. · .d and evil 
effects whereby one deci. ~ upon the 
necessity of placing the t fold effect 
act. If we had no pn ·~Htionately 
grave reason for 'allowinf.! · ,1e foreseen 
evil effect, then certain. we would 
not be morally permit; 
such needless injury to o. s person. If 
the evil effect is grave , t !, .1 the reason 
for placing the a- . must be 
proportionately grave. If · d e evil eff~ct 
be slight then the reasc · for pla~mg 
the act may be proporti tlately slight 
or greater. Also, if it ~,. possible to 
substitute a similar acti c• \ which has a 
lesser evil or perhaps , 10 evil effect 
whatsoever, then one 1i!USt seriously 
weigh the necessity of tJ··- intended act 
as opposed to the equivalent act ~r 
actions. One. may speak of this 
condition as the principle of 
reasonable or due proportionality· 
VARIOUS TYPES 
OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTS 
From what has been said thus far~ 
c~n be seen that mutilation maY 
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generic medical or 
procedure which results in two 
species of surgery directed 
the removal of a threatening 
or pathologic organ, or toward 
removal of healthy tissue or 
thy organ of the body. Certainly 
removal of a pathologic organ or 
llrelilteJnin:g mass which constitutes ·a 
to bodily integrity can be seen 
posing no moral difficulties under 
principle oftotality. 
exCision of 
tissue or organ, the moral 
is not so easily answered. 
we attempt to discuss the 
implications of organ 
tation, let us consider briefly 
implications ofexcision of healthy 
nonpathologic tissue. Tissue 
tation covers a broad variety 
transference oforganic living matter 
from tissue itself, as in corneal 
tatjon, skin grafting, etc., to 
derivatives, as in the case of the 
ones. The procedure of 
tation itself may involve: a) 
aui'mn~an, where tissue is taken 
one's own body; b) a homograft, 
involves ·a "tissue donation" 
another man; c) a heterograft, 
utilizes tissue or tissue 
IIV~ttiV4~s from different species. 2 2 
transplantation of tissue taken 
one's own body (autograft) 
no moral problem since the 
is in keeping with the 
of totality - a mutilation of 
in order to secure the well-being 
entire body. Generally speaking, 
(animal to man) is 
peJrm.itssible. 2 3 In the case of a 
(man to man) a distinction 
· made between a graft or 
taken from one who - is 
as opposed to one who is dead. 
is no moral problem presented 
tt10:mo1naft from the dead, such as 
· transplants from the recent dead or 
tissue obtained from "bank" 
resources. However, homograft from 
the living admits of moral qualification 
as follows: 
If the mutilation does not destroy 
the functional integrity of the 
donor, it is morally permissible 
according to good opinion. 
Examples are blood donation and 
kidney transplantation. If the 
mutilation destroys the functional 
integrity of the donor, it is 
immoral. An example would be the 
donation of both corneas.2 4 
It is obvious that our- present 
discussion is concerned with the 
homograft from a living person 




Following an analysis of the 
"obligation of charity and the order of 
charity in man's duties to his neighbor, 
especially the recognized liceity of 
sacrificing one's life for the sake of the 
neighbor's temporal welfare," Father 
Cunningham draws the following 
conclusion as a "sufficiently probable 
opinion": "Per se operations which 
involve the transplantation of organs 
or of sections thereof are. licit; they 
involve no opposition to the natural or 
supernatural moral law ."2 5 He is 
quick to speak of possible exceptions 
to this principle and allows for the 
same in two specific instances: 
First of all, if a person's being a 
donor · for an isoplasty would 
certainly or very probably cause his 
own death, then it would not be 
licit for him to allow · such a 
mutilation ... it does not seem 
consonant with traditional moral 
teaching to admit the liceity of his 
submission to a mutilation which 
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would certainly or even very 
probably cause his own 
death. . .. The second exception to 
this: if the result of such an 
operation would be sterility for the 
donor, then it would be illicit to 
permit or perform such a 
rimtilation? 6 
"The bases of Father Cunningham's 
opinion are: (a) the unity of men in 
specifically the same human nature; 
(b) the unity of men in the Mystical 
Body of Christ; (c) the resultant 
mutual relationships between men 
which involve their bodies and bodily 
members; (d) the observance of the 
precept of charity to one's neighbor in 
need."2 7 
Father Cunningham's mention of 
the first instance of exception would 
seem to substantiate the principle 
basic to all mutilation which does not 
allow for any procedure, medical or 
surgical, which would directly cause 
· the death of the individual. "A direct 
mutilation which would very likely 
cause a man's death would be direct 
cause of that death."2 8 Exposure of 
oneself to such danger would be 
tantamount to suicide. Hence, "if 
there is true and solid probability of 
his dying as a result of the mutilation, 
then we cannot admit the liceity of 
that operation . no matter what good 
might accrue to the neighbor as a 
result of it."2 9· 
Mutilation is licit only when the 
organic or functional integrity of the 
body or its members is not 
permanently impaired or destroyed ·so 
as to jeopardize the health or life of 
the corporeal totality. However, in 
virtue of the body's ability to repair 
itself and the compensatory nature of 
the twin organs it possesses when one 
such twin is diseased ·or removed, the 
principle would allow for the removal 
of tissue which can be replaced by the 
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ordinary process of nat t' .tl or 
extrinsically induced body re. 1ir, as 
well as the removal of tissth or an 
organ which can be ad; uately 
substituted for by the latent 
potentiality of homologous 1 · 'me or 
organ present in the body . . 
The moralist makes the di. :nction 
between the substan t f. and 
nonsubstantial integrity of t l body. 
From the foregoing we can .:e that 
submission to or performa .~ of a 
medical or surgical procedu which 
would result in a substantic• loss of 
bodily integrity would l. illicit. 
However, if we employ the inciples 
of reasonable proportiona :Y and 
fraternal charity we find th loss of 
non substantial integrity is ~ . aetimes 
permissible. Donation of a si; le organ 
such as a heart or liver woui result in 
a complete suppression c organic 
function in the corporeal . iality of 
the donor. Such a donat1. . i would 
result in a loss of sub stan ~ 1 bodily 
integrity and hence is illicit . iowever, 
in the case of double orga ~ .. such as 
the kidneys, ovari e ~ lungs, 
mechanisms of the eye and ,· rr, etc., it 
has been shown that the 1.; , · of one 
organ may result in loss of 
nonsubstantial integrity onl ~ 
Theologians and man< .sts have 
traditionally permitted e.x, •osure of 
one's life to risk for the sa'.i~ of one's 
neighbor. Fr. Cunningham ;·.~ els that it 
is within the bounds of th ,' principle 
of fraternal charity that 0 11'' may make 
the smaller sacrifice of dorn tion of an 
organ to his fellowman in need. There 
is substantial agreement an.ong those 
concerned with . the morality of 
organic transplantation that "minor 
mutilations" of bodily integrity are 
licit when there is present some 
proportionate reason for permitting 
them. "Certainly, the assistance of the 
neighbor who is in need . .. does 
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a sufficiently just cause for the 
ssion of such injuries to 
... And 'when the skin-graft 
the blood-transfusion is not 
for the donor, then they 
teem to be perfectly licit minor 
mutila!ions, permitted for the purpose 
of charity. " 3 0 And even cases of 
"experimentation involving minor or 
accidental mutilation or suppression of 
• organic function is not a violation 
Of man's guardianship of his life and 
integrity, and therefore is 
rally permissible for good 
,31 
i)&WIORIIIli'll. 
of the "Ethical and 
Directives for Catholic 
:_~lipitals'' states: 
Any procedure harmful to the 
patient is morally justified only 
insofar as it is . designed to produce 
a proportionate good. 
Or din ~ri ly . the "proportionate 
sood" that justifies a directly 
mutilating proc~dure must be the 
welfare of the patient himself. 
However, such things as blood 
transfusions and skin grafts are 
permitted for the good of others~ 
Whether this principle of "helping 
the neighbor" can justify organic 
transplantation is now a matter· of 
discussion. 
is seemingly beyond controversy 
minor mutilations are justifiable 
the principle of fraternal 
However, whether a donor 
to a major mutilation as in 
transplant which is not necessary 
the good of the health of the body 
rather for the good of one's 
bor does · present a moral 
-- -
- - ~-~--------
Furthermore, · Christian doctrine 
establishes, and the light of human 
reason makes it most clear, that 
private individuals have no power 
over the members of their bodies 
than that which pertains to their 
natural ends; and they are not free 
to destroy or mutilate their 
members, or in any other . way 
render themselves unfit for their 
natural functions, except when no 
other provision can be made for the 
good ofthe whole body.32 
The Pontifs statement would seem to 
make no allowance for the use of 
one's body in any manner whatsoever 
except for the sustaining of an 
individual's bodily integrity alone. 
~owever, it has been suggested by 
Father Gerald Kelly that the Pope was 
not treating of mutilation as such but 
rather of the rights which the state and 
the individual have in relation to 
sterilization.3 3 Pius XI declared that 
the state has no power whatsoever 
over the members of innocent ·citizens 
and added that the individual had only 
limited powers in this regard. In but a 
brief paragraph he incorporated the 
existing theology on the subject of 
self-mutilation. Fr. Kelly persues this 
line of reasoning by stating that the 
theologians of that time "commonly 
recognized only one natural-. purpose 
of organs, namely, to serve the person 
who possesses them."34 
But suppose that theologians today, 
after having carefully considered the 
facts concerning organic 
transplantation, would conclude that, 
since an organ or section thereof can 
function vitally in another body, this 
may also be called a natural (though 
secondary) purpose of such organs or 
sections .... If such an extended 
meaning is permissible, Father 
Cunningham's thesis can be 
harmonized with the encyclical; for if 




~ .. . '
of a pair of'organs, is transplanted, this 
transplanted part fulftlls a secondary 
natural purpose (helping the neighbor) 
without defeating the primary purpose 
(the good of one's own body).35 
Father Charles Curran in an 
interesting dialogue between himself as 
theologian and Dr. Robert White, 
director of Brain Research 
Laboratories at. ClevelaNd 
Metropolitan General Hospital, 
discussed the principle of fraternal 
charity as follows: · 
The general principle would be that 
one has administrative power over 
one's own body, and provided he 
does not appreciably _maim himself 
or open himself up to the risk of 
grave personal injury, he can give 
what he has to help someone 
else.3 6 
DEFINITION OF DEATH AND 
MORAL SPECULATION 
Among the many issues of a moral , 
medical, legal and social nature which 
are engendered by transplant surgery, 
the most crucial of these would seem 
to be the determination of the criteria 
of the moment of death of the donor. 
Recent advances in chemical and 
electronic cardiac resuscitation · 
techniques, as well as the use of 
mechanical respirators, have created a 
need for redefining the concept of · 
death. No longer is the heretofore 
standard definition - the complete 
and permanent cessation of respix:ation 
and circulation - adequate as totally 
descriptive of .medical death. The 
electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) is 
currently used in helping to establish 
"death," but its findings do not always 
afford a conclusive indication of actual 
brain damage. It has been found that a 
barbituate overdose may result in a 
flat E.E.G. for four hours or more. "A . 
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report of the Royal Acadt 
Medicine in London reve< ' 
among a group of 102 he a' 
victims who were still un> 
more than one month after ir: 
fewer than 63 survived and 48 
eventually went back to their 
or to less demanding l' 









Taking into account that · L~ brain 
is not capable of a i ficial 
resuscitation, as are the h' -rt and 
lungs, · Dr. William Like , past 
president of the American ( Hege of 
Cardiology suggests that: " . · Jth can 
be defined as coming wl- .1 brain 
function has ceased anteced. t tO · the 
death of cardiac function ." Added 
to the traditional criteria t · medical 
death is the cessation of 1 :ll brain 
function. It would seem tha. :he total 
"criteria of death" would ( •,:ompass 
complete and permanent ct :1tion of 
heart, lung and brain fun ct · ·1S. "But 
more and more doctors now . ··gue that 
life ends when the brain p t: -1anently 
ceases to function - even : , Jugh the 
heartbeat and respiration may be 
. d b 'fi . 1 - t " 39 sustame . y artl tcta resp· ·a ors. 
Is it possible that medical :~ ath is to 
be determined on the ba ·:; of the 
complete cessation of funct<m of one 
organ alone? That this may '-·. ell be the 
case is evidenced as follows: 
Cooley (Dr. Denton A.) : ted that 
in each of three heart trr, 1splants he 
has done' the heart w e,:; 'faintly 
quivering' - although nc : beating-
at the time it was removcd.4 0 
The acceptance of "brain death" as 
the sole criterion is not outside of the 
realm of the possible. How~'ve r, at the 
present time it can in no way be 
medically accepted as so until such 
time as the apparati for determining 
cessation of brain function are brought 
to a new level of sensitivity and 
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tion. Granted that such 
is possible in our age of 
and technological advance, 
are innumerable moral, legal and 
al questions which can be 
only in the light of a 
'll l11tfini1tive medical statement on death. 
is not only the responsibility, but 
prerogative of the men of medical 
SCience to formulate such a definition. 
1Rlbvev1er, the definition must be fixed 
than argumentative; for unless 
know precisely of medical death, 
issues of a moral nature cannot 
41 . 
resolved. For example, let us 
a statement by Fr. John 
ynch in relation to heart 
tation: 
no circumstances, even if the 
~o,.aJro!:nPi''ti've donor is certainly 
r¥1~JUn:tea to die within a very short 
may the doctor anticipate 
and begin removing the heart 
a living 'human subject. This 
ement derives from a 
tr1Deolof!ical view of man's dominion 
life ... that depends 
on an essential distinction between 
the moral obligation not to kill and 
the moral obligation to keep alive. 
Only the former is absolute. In 
lec~rdance with it, direct killing of 
mnocent human being, even if 
otherwise already doomed to die, 
remains murder.4 2 
stated that "the doctor may not 
death." But unless we know 
. what is meant by death, we 
proceed no further. 
is true that a man does not have 
dominion over his life; but what 
precisely over which he has no 
dominion, his life of brain, of 
or of lungs, or all three? The 
of fraternal charity would 
allow a dominion over at least 
a set of paired organs of the 
body in the inter~st of the physical 
well-being of one's neighbor. May not 
the principle be extended to the heart, 
lungs, pancreas, etc. , which could no 
longer serve the function for which 
they were given to this man by the 
Creator since inevitable "total death" 
is imminent in virtue of brain death? 
It is obvious that transplantation of 
non-paired organs under the present 
definition of death is nothing other 
than homicide, pure and simple. Even 
the principle of fraternal charity could 
not be employed if the definition 
remains confused, for , "just as killing 
out of mercy to the patient would 
always be wrong, so too, killing to 
obtain a transplant (mercy to another) 
would always be wr,ong."4 3 This is so, 
for in either case , there is the direct 
killing of an innocent human being 
(murder) for some particular end 
disguised under the cloak of "mercy to 
one's neighbor;" a euphemistic ·action 
which can in no way be morally 
justified. "Whatever, then, may be the 
. acceptable indications of medical 
death, these must be verified before 
one could allow the removal of an 
organ so essential to life that its 
excision would amount to a direct 
killing. " 4 4 
But let us for a moment embark on 
a bold venture and discuss the 
possibility of ·medical death as being 
determined by the criterion of "brain 
death" alone. It may become a reality 
that the E.E.G. and other related 
instruments will be made so sensitive 
that they can give an unquestionable 
reading of actual brain death. When 
the condition of the brain has indeed 
reached a point of no return in the 
sense that there is an absolute 
cessation of brain function beyond the 
ability of the . organ or body to 
reconstitute the same , according to 
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current tendencies the heretofore 
traditional criteria of death would not 
constitute an essential part of th~ 
definition of medical death.4 5 
If the medical world were to decide 
that medical death is simply brain 
death, there would be no medical or 
legal problem of heart , lung, kidney or 
other paired or non-paired transplant 
surgery. It would be unnecessary to 
discuss the moral aspects of organ 
donation since there would be no 
moral problem. The .only exception to 
the moral permissibility of organ 
donation under the "brain criterion of 
death" would be the donation of the 
brain itself; and this would in itself 
present no problem, since the brain 
cannot be used if indeed it is dead. 
Again, if medical certitude were 
made possible by a new sophistication 
of instruments whereby brain death 
could accurately be qetermined; and if 
the findings of such technology were 
used as the sole criterion of death, one 
can easily envision the haste with 
which transplant surgery of varied 
types would come about. Perhaps the 
· prospect of an ample supply of body 
organs and parts which would be 
precipitated by the acceptance of such 
a unique standard would cause some 
to readily accept a norm based on the 
brain criterion above. And of course in 
the mind of the layman there would 
remain the question of whether one is 
being in fact murdered when a vital 
organ is removed from one who is 
"medically dead" (brain dead) but 
whose heart and lungs continue to 
function either naturally or artificially. 
This q1,1estion I would suspect will 
cause the medical · community to use 
the criteria of total or absolute 
cessation of the vital functions of at 
least the brain and heart taken 
together .4 6 If this does not occur, 
then a new definition of life must be 
determined. 
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And if life is simply define1 as "the 
continued vital functioning of the 
brain ," then removal of a via1 ~ heart, 
lung, pancreas, etc., after br '1 death 
has been accurately establish· ~ would 
seem to be morally perrnissi! ~ - If we 
repeat the words of Fr. Lyn . L at this 
point , viz. , "whatever, then may be 
the acceptable indications o medical 
death, these . must be verifj, l before 
one could allow the remo J of an 
organ so essential to li/ ( that its 
exciston would amount t< a direct 
killing," we can see that mly the 
removal of the brain ib f would 
constitute a direct killing nder the 
"one criterion" definition c death.47 
And of course removal of Jn-paired 
donor organs essential to or tpportive 
of the life of the brain s h as the 
lungs (in their entirety) an the heart 
would obviously be morall) irong and 
medically foolish. Hence, , heart or 
lungs or any other non-p;_ ·~ d organs 
of the body could be p. -;ured for 
1 ' ·,1 "brain transplantation on y wr 
death" has been um. ' ;stionably 
established and occurs pri, · to "heart 
death." 
SUMMATION 
One might simply say ~.·:at because 
of the complexity of e"'- iblishing a 
definitive statement on tl _: concept ~: 
death that the "decisio: of death 
should be left to the lJrofess~o~al 
discretion of the attendi:.g phystctan 
in each individual ca:-: · Howeve~ 
practical this was prior t:.1 the c~rren 
revolution in ·transplant Sil rgery, tt h~ 
lost certain aspects of i L' validity ~ 
'the sense of the legai and mor t 
complications which are contingend 
upon the rights of both donor an 
. · heretofore reciptent which were f 
· · no non-existent . Perhaps the mventto 
t success an artificial heart or grea er h 
1 t e with heterografts may so ve h e 
problems with which we are er 
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JbOernea, but until that occurs, one 
. ·apply what knowledge of moral 
he has to the present 
llttll!lticm. In summation let us look to 
moral principles discussed which 
... ...,, - ....... be applied to the resolution of 
moral complexities of organ 
J'· lranspJan1tation. 
God alone has direct dominien over 
the person of man; and reserved to 
Him alone is the power of life and 
death. 
Since · man is but steward of his 
·person, he is always morally obliged 
to use ordinary means of sustaining 
bodily ·integrity; whereas under 
certain conditions one may use 
extraordinary means if he so desires. 
The justification of mutilation rests 
in the proportionate necessity of 
sacrificing a part of · the body in 
order to preserve the integrity of 
the whole when the welfare of the 
whole body cannot be secured by 
any other means. 
the case of a two-fold effect act, 
r'ffJJlen:~bv there results a good effect 
i$ intended and an evil effect 
is foreseen but unintended, 
e conditions of prudent 
1 ua tion of such a unique 
of human act as 
comsiaered above must be fulfilled. 
of Fraternal Charity: 
one's neighbor 
one may morally do for 
'1968 
The Roman Catholic church as yet 
has not given its official teaching on 
the question of organic transplantation 
inter vivos, but of course the 
discussions among theologians and 
moralists have. greatly increased in the 
past few months since the 
announcement of the first human 
heart transplant. 
"Of those ·who have , expressed 
themselves publicly on the subject, the 
majority - it would seem safe to say -
profess to see at least solidly probable 
grounds for declaring this form of 
trans p 1 an tation permissible under 
certain circumstances. " 4 8 There are 
those, however, who express a strong 
contradictory view and would allow 
mutilation only when it is necessary 
for one's own physical well-being. In 
keeping with the principle of fraternal 
charity ~ those who defend the licitness 
of organic transplant to assist one's 
neighbor proclaim one may morally do 
for another what one may legitimately 
do for oneself. But what is the 
transplant surgeon to do in the wake 
of such a variety of opinion? Fr. 
Lynch would grant him that course of 
action which would allow him the 
"greater liberty of medical action" 
when he says: 
No one is required to acknowledge 
as obligatory a prohibition which is 
at best objectively doubtful. In 
other words, no theologian could 
legitimately accuse of moral wrong 
doing the physician who involves 
himself professionally in organic 
transplantation with due regard for 
those · precautions which sound 
medical sense would prescribe for 
that procedure. Or to put it more 
precisely ... the doctor, ·who in 
medical prudence seeks to preserve 
human life by means of organic 
transplantation, can merit no less 
theologically than he does 
scientifically. 4 9 
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And so the dialogue continues. And so 
we end our discussion. 
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